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Abstract
Errors involving medication administration can be costly, both in fi-
nancial and in human terms. Indeed, there is much potential for errors
due to the complexity of the medication administration process. Nurses
are often singled out as the only responsible of these errors because they
are in charge of drug administration. Nevertheless, the interventions of
every actor involved in the process and the system design itself contribute
to errors [23]. Proper inpatient medication safety systems can help to
reduce such errors in hospitals. In this paper, we review in depth two
recent proposals [7, 12] that pursue the aforementioned objective. Un-
fortunately, they fail in their attempt mainly due to their security faults
but interesting ideas can be drawn from both. These security faults refer
to impersonation and replay attacks that could produce the generation
of a forged proof stating that certain medication was administered to an
inpatient when it was not. We propose a leading-edge solution to enhance
inpatient medication safety based on RFID technology that overcomes
these weaknesses. Our solution, named Inpatient Safety RFID system
(IS-RFID), takes into account the Information Technology (IT) infras-
tructure of a hospital and covers every phase of the drug administration
process. From a practical perspective, our system can be easily integrated
within hospital IT infrastructures, has a moderate cost, is very ease to use
and deals with security aspects as a key point.
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A medication error is a failure in the treatment process that may harm a pa-
tient [2]. It can be produced during different phases: prescribing, manufacturing
or dispensing the formulation, administering the treatment and monitoring the
therapy. Although medication errors are almost inevitable, patient safety can
be improved by means of proper Information Technology (IT) systems. For in-
stance, failure due to a misinterpretation of a hand-written prescription can be
easily avoided with IT tools. Drug and patient identification systems can auto-
mate certain processes to guarantee that the appropriate prescription is given
to each patient. According to [2], there are two possible kinds of errors when
carrying out a correct plan: action based errors (slips) and memory based errors
(lapses). An example of a slip is picking up a bottle containing “diazepam” from
the pharmacy shelf when intending to pick up “dilitiazem” instead. A simple
example of a lapse is the administration of penicillin to a patient who is actually
known to be allergic. Possible known preventive mechanisms for these errors
are cross-checking, avoiding distractions and labeling medicines clearly.
According to international studies, medication errors occur predominantly
with medication orders (49% - 56%) or administering medication (26% - 34 %)
[13]. A research, made by Peijas Hospital (Finland) [15], supports these inter-
national reports: 33.6% of all medication errors were related to documentation,
31.1% were related to medication administration, and 19.5% were linked to med-
ication prescription. Effective nursing is defined as a “five-right” method [3]:
treating the right patient, with the right drug, in the right dose, in the correct
way and at the right time. However, nurses are working under a lot of pres-
sure and the nursing shortage nowadays is a major concern for the healthcare
providers [8, 18]. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology may help to
reduce nurses’ workload and decrease their slips and lapses. The Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) placed “Improve
the accuracy of patient identification” at the top of its list of National Patient
Safety Goals (NPSG) again for 2010 [19], a position it has held for years.
1.1 Background
This paper uses RFID technology to enhance the medication safety of inpatients.
RFID is a technology for identification using radio waves. Its main components
are a tag, a reader and a data system for handling the information. An RFID
tag includes an antenna and a chip for computation and information storage
purposes. The content of the chip can be read and written with an RFID reader.
The technology may be comparable to the barcode identification system, where
a barcode scanner reads the information from a printed barcode. One of the
main differences is that RFID identification systems do not need a line of sight
to read or write tags. The information of RFID tags can be rewritten and an
RFID reader can read hundreds of tags per second. In addition, RFID tags have
computational power, more storage capacity and are more resistant to harsh
environmental conditions compared to barcodes. Security mechanisms can also
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be incorporated into RFID systems providing authentication, non-repudiation,
integrity or privacy services.
In 2005, Wu et al. [24] proposed the idea of applying RFID technology to
improve drug safety for inpatients. Later, Sun et al. [22] proposed a specific
system that uses RFID for inpatient identification and barcodes for unit-dose
medication identification. In their system, once a prescription is ordered by
the physician, the Hospital Information System (HIS) informs the pharmacy to
start the drug package procedure. When the unit-dose (UD) is prepared it is
labeled with a barcode. The information stored on it (i.e. the drugs making
up the unit-dose) is also stored in the database. In order to perform a drug
dispatch procedure, a nurse brings a UD cart, carrying a PC and a Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA), to the inpatient’s bedside. Then, the PDA is used
as an RFID reader to scan the barcodes on the drug package and the RFID
wristband carried by the inpatient. Sun et al. assume that the information
needed for matching the barcode identifier with the patient identifier is stored
in the PC. The main drawbacks of their proposal are the need to move a PC
during the drug administration procedure and the use of barcodes for unit-
dose identification instead of low-cost RFID tags. Although their work is very
interesting, it lacks important technical details such as a description of the
protocol involved in the identification process.
Huang and Ku [12] proposed an RFID grouping proof protocol for the med-
ication safety of inpatients. A grouping proof protocol provides evidence for the
simultaneous reading of a group of RFID tags [14, 21]. This evidence is created
by an RFID reader and can be checked for validity by a verifier. Huang and Ku
pursued to create a proof of the simultaneous presence of the inpatient (pallet in
their notation) and the drugs corresponding to her prescription. They assumed
that every inpatient has a bracelet or wristband with an RFID embedded tag
and that every pill container is also identified by an RFID tag. Although it is a
good idea to use a grouping-proof to link inpatients with their prescription, the
protocol they present has two problems. The first is that, although the proposed
grouping-proof protocol is assumed to be executed online (i.e. the reader acts
as a verifier in real time) in reality the generated evidence should be verified
offline. If an online verifier is available, it is better to use an authentication
protocol instead of a grouping-proof protocol, since it is usually more efficient
and easier to design [7]. In that case, the design of an online grouping-proof
is based on limiting the time span to authenticate each tag. Secondly, Huang
and Ku’s protocol has some serious security flaws. Chien et al. [7] pointed out
some of these flaws and proposed two new protocols: an online authentication
protocol and an offline grouping-proof. Unfortunately, both schemes [7, 12] are
also vulnerable to certain attacks as we will show in Section 2. It is important
to note that Huang and Ku’s and Chien et al.’s protocols use low-cost tags
conforming to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard (EPC Gen-2) and that they
do not provide anonymous identification. Therefore, an eavesdropper would be
able to know the prescription of an inpatient easily.
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1.2 Motivation
An offline grouping-proof provides evidence for auditing errors but it does not
prevent them in real time. An online grouping-proof (i.e. an authentication pro-
tocol with time span restriction) demands access to the Hospital Information
System (HIS) to verify the proof online. Therefore, it needs some kind of wire-
less infrastructure to connect PDAs (readers) with the HIS (verifier). We think
this approach is expensive and so could be inoperative due to the overload or
complete unavailability of the wireless network. Thus, we propose an approach
which can be used to verify that an inpatient and her bedside prescription are
matched correctly, without using any wireless infrastructure or any other per-
manent connection to the HIS. Furthermore, our system creates an evidence
(offline grouping-proof) establishing that the right unit-dose has been adminis-
tered to the right inpatient at the right time. Additionally, it enables tracking
the identity of the nurses that administered each treatment. Our proposal au-
tomates the “five-right” method, thus minimizing errors. It also audits the
whole process and allows further investigations on slips and lapses. The main
difference with previous work is that we consider the complete process, from
the prescription phase to the monitoring of the therapy phase. Furthermore, we
include the technical details of the proposed protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes our
attacks on Chien et al. ’s and Huang and Ku’s protocols. Then, section 3
exposes our framework to enhance inpatient safety that focus on security, cost-
effectiveness and ease of use. Section 4 analyses the security and the performance
of our proposal and finally section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Attacks on recent protocols for inpatient med-
ication safety
In this section we reveal several security pitfalls in RFID grouping-proofs that
aim to enhance inpatient medication safety. Two of the analyzed protocols are
online and the last is offline. First, we show how the online protocols [7, 12]
leak private information in the messages transmitted over the insecure radio
channel. This weakness is critical, since it allows the easy impersonation of
tags. Then, we describe a replay attack on grouping-proofs that allows the
generation of fake proofs. Specifically, a rogue reader can generate a proof that
links a subset of simultaneously read legitimate tags to any other legitimate
tag. Several grouping protocols such as [7, 21] fall into this flaw. We will give
details about this fault concentrating on the protocol proposed in [7]. We use
the following methodology to describe the proposed attacks. First, the protocol
is presented and then the attack and its consequences are exposed.
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2.1 Huang’s and Ku’s online protocol for medication safety
of inpatient
Huang and Ku [12] proposed an online grouping-proof compatible to Gen-2
standard (EPC Class-1 Generation-2 [10]; ISO/IEC 18006-C [1]), which is one
of the most relevant standards for low-cost RFID tags. Unlike previous proposals
that use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and hash functions, operations
supported on EPC Gen-2 tags are limited to a 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number
Generation (PRNG) function, bitwise operations (e.g. exclusive OR (XOR)),
and a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) function. Additionally, these tags have
two passwords of 32 bits each: (1) an access password (PIN) which controls
the access to the reserved memory; (2) a kill password which upon reception
irreversibly deactivates the tag.
The authors proposed a scheme to generate an evidence that {Tag1, Tag2,
. . . , Tagn, Pallet Tag} are scanned simultaneously (see Figure 1). Tagi repre-
sents a specific drug and the Pallet Tag corresponds to the inpatient. For a
detailed description of the protocol, the reader is urged to consult [12]. We now
focus on the messages received/transmited by one of the participating tags (e.g.
Tagi):
1.0 The reader sends to Tagi the authentication message mi−1 computed by
Tagi−1.
2.0 Tagi computes its response (ri) and updates its PINi:
2.1 Tagi inserts mi−1 and PINi into its PRNG function to generate ri =
PRNG(mi−1) and ci = PRNG(PINi), respectively.
2.2 The tag concatenates the Electronic Product Code (EPCi) and ci
and computes its CRC.
2.3 The bitwise XOR operation between the above result, ci and ri is
calculated (mi = CRC(EPC||ci)⊕ ci ⊕ ri).
2.4 The tuple {EPCi,mi} is sent to the reader and the tag updates its
access password (PINi = ci).
2.1.1 Forgery attack on Huang’s and Ku’s protocol
Contrary to the author’s assumption [12], a CRC is not a secure hash function.
Consequently, an attacker may obtain information from the messages transmit-
ted over the channel. CRC functions are based on polynomial arithmetic in F2.
Computing a CRC value for a given binary stream is performed by dividing the
polynomial associated with this stream by another fixed polynomial (genera-
tor polynomial) and obtaining a remainder. Due to linearity, CRCs have the
following properties [11, 20]:
CRC(A⊕B) = CRC(A)⊕ CRC(B) (1)
CRC(A||B) = CRC(A << n)⊕ CRC(B) (2)
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where A and B represent arbitrary values and n is the bit-length of B. An
attacker can exploit the above properties to obtain private information linked
to the target tag and impersonate this tag in a future grouping-proof protocol.
The attacker follows the phases described below.
Phase 1. Acquiring private information:
1.0 The adversary sends to Tagi an arbitrary value a.
1.1 Tagi computes its response (ri) and updates its PINi:
1.1.1 Tagi first inserts a and PINi into its PRNG to generate ri =
PRNG(a) and ci = PRNG(PINi), respectively.
1.1.2 The tag concatenates EPCi and ci and computes its CRC.
Third, the bitwise XOR operation between the above result, ci
and ri is calculated (mi = CRC(EPC||ci)⊕ ci ⊕ ri).
1.1.3 The pair {EPCi,mi} is sent to the adversary and the tag updates
its access password (PINi = ci).
1.2 The adversary knows value ri since the known seed a takes part in
its generation. The static identifier of the tag (EPCi) is transmit-
ted in clear over the channel and thus can be easily revealed to the
adversary. Taking advantage of this knowledge and the properties of
CRC functions, the adversary can disclose certain private information
linked to the tag:
mi = CRC(EPCi||ci)⊕ ci ⊕ ri = (3)
= CRC(EPCi << n)⊕ CRC(ci)⊕ ci ⊕ ri
More precisely, the adversary obtains Si = CRC(ci) ⊕ ci, which is
a value linked to the target tag univocally. According to the Gen-2
standard ci’s bit-length is 16. Therefore, n = 16 in Eq. (2). The
reader should note that only public messages are used for this com-
putation.
Si = CRC(ci)⊕ ci = mi ⊕ CRC(EPCi << 16)⊕ ri (4)
Phase 2. Generation of a forged proof:
2.0 The legitimate reader sends to the adversary –impersonating Tagi–
the authentication message m
′
i−1 computed by Tagi−1.
2.1 The adversary inserts m
′






i−1). Then, the message authentication m
′
i is computed
by means of Equation 4, m
′
i = Si ⊕ r
′
i ⊕ CRC(EPCi << 16).
Thus, the adversary can deceive the reader/verifier to think that Tagi is
involved in the proof when it is absent. It is important to note that Si is
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closely related to PINi. The impact of this attack depends on when it will
be launched. In the protocol, the target tag updates its PIN just after the
interrogation by the adversary. However, the updating is not performed
by the verifier, as this entity is not aware that the tag has been read. That
is, the reader and the tag will have lost their synchronization after the tag
is read by the adversary. This fact is very advantageous for an adversary
since the adversary has an indefinite time window at her disposal to im-
personate the tags. After tag impersonation, the corresponding legitimate
tag and the verifier are resynchronized, and the whole attack – phases 1
and 2 – must be repeated in order to supplant the legitimate tag again.
Thus, updating the secret information (PIN) is an appropriate method,
as it reduces the consequence of leaked private information on the chan-
nel. However, updates are performed even if there is no confirmation that
interrogation comes from a legitimate reader. An adversary can exploit
this weakness to conduct a very simple denial-of-service attack: if a fake
request is sent to a tag, the tag and the verifier will become unsynchro-
nized. Additionally, Chien et al. [7] show that Huang and Ku [12] scheme
is vulnerable to replay attacks.
The consequences of such an attack are very serious in a medical applica-
tion scenario. Anyone with a device able to simulate a tag (e.g. mobile
phone) at her disposal, may generate a forged grouping-proof stating that
certain medication was present while it was not. Consequently, a nurse
could not refuse any false accusations of negligence or abuse. Regarding
the denial of service attack, anyone under the aforementioned conditions
may stop the system and prevent the generation of grouping-proofs.
2.2 Chien et al.’s online protocol to enhance inpatient
medication safety
Chien et al. [7] proposed an authentication protocol conforming to the Gen-2
standard [10]. The operations on the tags are limited to a 16-bit PRNG function
and a bitwise XOR operation. Additionally, the verifier and each tag share a
secret PINi while the tags store into their memory a static identifier (EPCi).
As the verifier (reader) is online, any RFID authentication protocol may be
used. Specifically, the following scheme was proposed (see Figure 2):
0.0 The reader starts the timer.
1.0 The reader generates a random number NR as a challenge to all the tags
in its range.
The following procedure is repeated for all the tags:
2.0 The tag generates a random number Ni, and computes a pseudo-random
message authentication code:
MACi = PRNG(EPCi ⊕ PRNG(PINi) (5)
⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(Ni))
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The tag sends to the reader the tuple {EPCi, Ni,MACi}.
2.1 The reader stops the timer and checks the correctness of MACi for each
tag. If MACi is correct, the tags {Tag1, Tag2, . . . , Tagn, TagPallet} are
associated. Otherwise the protocol is aborted. Finally, the reader verifies
that all the tags’ answers are within a predefined time window.
2.2.1 Forgery attack on Chien et al.’s protocol
We now show why the above protocol [7] is vulnerable to a passive attack.
Basically, an adversary after eavesdropping several grouping-proof sessions can
impersonate a target tag indefinitely. We focus our analysis on a specific Tagi
but it is straightforward to perform the attack in parallel for a set of tags.
Suppose that the adversary is eavesdropping the messages exchanged between
Tagi and a legitimate reader. If the adversary detects that the random numbers
generated by these two entities are equal (i.e. NR = Ni), then she may intercept
the corresponding MACi and store it for future use. In such a case, the MACi
is independent of any random number and becomes a constant value, Si, as
shown in the following equation.
Si = PRNG(EPCi ⊕ PRNG(PINi)⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(Ni)) (6)
= PRNG(EPCi ⊕ PRNG(PINi)⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(NR))
= PRNG(EPCi ⊕ PRNG(PINi))
As a consequence, the adversary can impersonate the target Tagi as described
below:
1.0 The reader generates a random number N
′
R as challenge to the adversary.
2.0 The adversary sends to the reader the tuple {EPCi, N ′R, Si}.
The adversary – impersonating Tagi – is thus authenticated by the reader
and the attack succeeds. The adversary exploits the linearity of bitwise oper-
ations to perform this attack. It is important to note that this attack can be
launched at any time.
The remaining question is how many grouping-proof sessions have to be
eavesdropped by the adversary to detect a session where NR = Ni. The reader
should note here that the random challenges have a length of 16 bits as required
by the Gen-2 standard. Therefore, and due to the birthday paradox [4], the




16 ' 286 sessions to find a colli-
sion. In summary, the adversary needs to eavesdrop a small number of sessions
to impersonate the target tag and generate a forged grouping-proof.
The impact of such an attack is similar to that described in section 2.1.1. A
nurse could be falsely accused of negligence or abuse, since a forged electronic
proof stating that an inappropriate drug was present (and probably adminis-
tered to an inpatient).
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2.3 Chien et al.’s offline protocol to enhance inpatient
medication safety
Chien et al.’s offline protocol [7] is focused on proving that a specific group of
drugs are indeed given to specific inpatients. Accordingly, the offline verifier
knows in advance which drugs correspond to each inpatient (i.e. the prescrip-
tion). Thus, each drug is associated with a tag and a special tag refers to an
inpatient (Pallet). In their notation, EPCi is the tag identifier of Tagi and
EPCPallet is the tag identifier of the inpatient (Pallet). The steps of the pro-
tocol, represented in Figure 3, are the following:
1. V erifier → Reader: t = EKV (timestamp)
First, the reader gets an encrypted timestamp t = EKV (timestamp) from
the verifier, where EKV (timestamp) denotes an encryption of the current
timestamp using verifier’s secret key KV .
2. Reader → Tag1, Pallet: t
The reader sends the encrypted timestamp to Tag1 and the inpatient
(Pallet).
3. For i = 1, . . . , n− 1
3.1 Tagi → Reader: EPCi,mi
If i = 1, then let m0 = t;
Tagi computes mi = PRNG(EPCi⊕PRNG(mi−1)⊕PRNG(PINi))
and then sends the pair {EPCi,mi} to the reader.
3.2 Reader → Tagi+1: mi
The reader forwards mi to the next tag Tagi+1.
4. Tagn and Pallet
4.1 Tagn → Reader: EPCn,mn
Tagn computes mn = PRNG(EPCn⊕PRNG(mn−1)⊕PRNG(PINn))
and then sends the pair {EPCn,mn} to the reader.
4.2 Reader → Pallet: mn
The reader forwards mn to the inpatient (Pallet).
4.3 Pallet→ Reader: EPCPallet,mPallet
Upon receiving mn, the inpatient (Pallet) computes mPallet =
PRNG(EPCPallet ⊕ PRNG(mn) ⊕ PRNG(PINPallet)) and sends
both EPCPallet and mPallet to the reader.
5. Reader → V erifier: (t, EPC1,m1, . . . , EPCn,mn, EPCPallet,mPallet)
The reader collects the evidence (t, EPC1,m1, . . . , EPCn,mn, EPCPallet,
mPallet) and forwards it to the verifier.
6. The verifier checks:
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6.1 whether the association (EPC1, . . . , EPCn, EPCPallet) holds for the
prescription.
6.2 whether the evidence (m1, ..,mn,mPallet) holds.
6.3 that the decrypted timestamp DKV (t) is within a reasonable time
span.
If all three conditions hold, the grouping-proof succeeds.
2.3.1 Replay Attacks on Chien et al.’s offline protocol
Chien et al.’s protocol [7] assumes that the verifier knows in advance what the
prescription for each inpatient is. Let us suppose that the prescription of inpa-
tient A is a subset of the prescription of inpatient B. In these conditions, it is
possible to generate a proof that inpatient A has received her prescription just by
eavesdropping the messages exchanged while generating the proof for inpatient
B. For instance, let inpatient A’s (PalletA) prescription be “ibuprofen” (Tag1)
and “penicillin” (Tag2) and let inpatient B’s (PalletB) prescription be “ibupro-
fen” (Tag1), “penicillin” (Tag2) and “morphine” (Tag3). Once the messages
corresponding to the grouping-proof for inpatient B (t, EPC1,m1, EPC2,m2,
EPCPalletB , EPC3,m3,mPalletB ) have been eavesdropped, a rogue reader can
replay m2 to inpatient A (PalletA) and generate the corresponding fake proof
with the response (t, EPC1,m1, EPC2,m2, EPCPalletA ,mPalletA).
This attack has a severe impact when a nurse forgets to administer the
appropriate treatment to an inpatient. In that case she could easily generate a
forged proof stating that the treatment was administered while it was not. In
the aforementioned example, given that the nurse has administered the proper
treatment to inpatient B at the right time, she could also generate an out-of-
time proof and claim that she has also administered the appropriate treatment
to inpatient A.
3 IS-RFID System
In this section, we propose an innovative solution to enhance medication safety
based on RFID technology. We name our solution Inpatient Safety RFID system
(IS-RFID). While previous proposals [7, 12] focus on an specific problem such
as the grouping-proof protocol, our solution is designed to take into account the
complete IT infrastructure of a modern hospital [16]. Although barcodes are
a mature identification technology, we favor the use of RFID technology, since
the latter has significant advantages.
In our proposed system, RFID tags are linked to the inpatients (e.g. wrist-
bands) and to the unit-dose medications (e.g. labeled plastic packages) that
need to be identified. RFID readers obtain the static identifier of each tag,
which may then be used as a search index in a database to retrieve all the
information linked to the labelled item. The reader must be connected to the
back-end database via a secure (i.e. authenticated and encrypted) channel in
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order to access the aforementioned information. This is a usual assumption in
RFID systems. We assume that the used tags conform the EPC Gen-2 standard
and thus are passive, have a 32-bit password and support an on-board 16-bit
PRNG function.
We now describe how the proposed system works within the framework of a
hospital IT infrastructure where it is crucial to avoid errors in the administration
of drugs. Specifically, four procedures should be followed to guarantee the safety
in the administration of the physician’s orders (see Figures 4 and 5):
Drug Package Procedure: A physician visits an inpatient to diagnose her.
First, the physician reads the RFID tag attached to her wristband by using
a PDA that includes an RFID reader. A static identifier (Inpatienti) is
obtained from this reading and the inpatient is univocally identified. After
the examination of the inpatient, he issues a new prescription (i.e. a list of
medications). Once the physician has visited his inpatients, he goes to his
office and connects the PDA to his PC to register the prescriptions to the
Hospital Information System (HIS). Then, the HIS informs the pharmacy
to start the drug package procedure. In the pharmacy, the Automatic
Medication Dispenser (AMD) prepares the unit-doses according to the
orders received. Basically, the AMD picks up each drug included in each
prescription and introduces them in a plastic package. During this process,
a grouping-proof such as the one described in [17] may be used to generate
an evidence that these drugs were indeed introduced simultaneously in the
corresponding package. Then, the AMD generates an identifier (UDi) to
this unit-dose and writes this information on a passive tag, which is finally
attached to the packet. The AMD informs the HIS about the completion
of the process and the unit-dose identifier is registered in the HIS. Thus,
at this point, the HIS has the following record linked to the inpatient.
Inpatienti UDi Additional Informationi
The additional information field may include the time interval for unit-
dose administration, the right route and the right dose or even a link to
the electronic patient record.
Nurse Station Procedure: The nurse station receives a cart from the phar-
macy with the unit-dose medications for the inpatients in floor F . A
nurse – using a PC station – is logged into the system and gets access
to the HIS. Then, she sends an information request about the drugs that
have to be dispatched in the floor F at the current administration pe-
riod. Consequently, the HIS sends the tuples {Inpatienti, UDi, ti, Ad-
ditional Informationi}i=Ni=1 , assuming that a group of N inpatients are in
floor F . The third element ti represents a timestamp that will be valid
within a time window specified in advance and registered into the HIS.
That is, the administration of the UDi to the Inpatienti has to be carried
out within this time window. Finally, the nurse transfers these records to
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her PDA and the administration round starts. This last step is crucial
and facilitates the fact that the next step can be offline (i.e. no connec-
tion with the HIS needed). This represents a significant advantage over
previous proposals such as [22] in which a permanent connection to the
HIS database is required. Accordingly, the following information is stored
in the nurse’s PDA:
Inpatient1 UD1 t1 Additional Information1
. . .
Inpatienti UDi ti Additional Informationi
. . .
InpatientN UDN tN Additional InformationN
Safe Drug Administration Procedure: Each nurse is equipped with a PDA
that functions as an RFID reader and as a local device. The nurse takes the
PDA and the cart with the doses and visits the inpatients to administrate
their treatments. The process is divided into two phases (see the bottom
part of Figure 5).
A: A verification process is executed just before administration in order
to check the univocal correspondence between an inpatient and her
unit-dose.
B: An evidence of drug administration to an inpatient is generated by
the nurse.
By means of these procedures, we pursue to enhance medication safety
for inpatients. Our automatic verification is incorporated into the drug
administration process to prune human errors [6, 9]. By a simple and
transparent mechanism, the nurse can gain confidence of the matching
between the inpatient at her side and the corresponding unit-dose medi-
cation. More precisely, the following procedure – depicted in Figure 5 – is
proposed.
Step A. 1 The nurse’s RFID reader generates a random number rP and sends
a request message {request, rP } to the tag attached to the inpatient
wristband and to the tag linked to the drugs package.
Step A. 2 Each of these two tags receives the request, computes and sends
an anonymous identifier to the reader, where rW and rM represent
random numbers generated by the inpatient’s tag and unit-dose’s tag,
respectively.
– The inpatient’s tag computes and sends {rW , PRNG(Inpatienti,
rP , rW )} to the reader.
– The unit-dose’s tag computes and sends {rM , PRNG(UDi, rP ,
rM )} to the reader.
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Step A. 3 The reader receives both values and a search process starts over the
PDA stored records. The pair {Inpatient1, UD1} is obtained and
the PDA generates a local version of the anonymous identifiers:
{PRNG(Inpatient1, rP , rW ), PRNG(UD1, rP , rM )}. If these com-
puted values equal the received values, a confirmation message is
displayed in the screen of the PDA, a log is created, and the nurse
can safely administer the drugs to the inpatient. Otherwise, the pro-
cess is repeated with the following record {Patient2, UD2} in the
PDA until a match is found or there are no more records. If no
match found is found, the nurse stops the administration procedure
and investigates the problem.
Once the inpatient and the unit-dose medication are matched the nurse
administers the treatment. In addition, she can generate an evidence
of the correct administration of treatment by simultaneously scanning
both tags within the time window specified by the HIS. Considering that
the proposed approach uses passive RFID tags, the effectiveness of the
protocol depends on the reader’s reliable function who activates the tags
(i.e. passive backscatter or inductive coupling). The inpatient’s and the
unit-dose’s tags store an identifier and a key in their memory: that is,
{Inpatienti,KInpatienti} and {UDi,KUDi}, respectively. The messages
exchanged between the three involved entities are described below (see
Figure 5):
Step B. 1 The nurse’s RFID reader queries the inpatient’s tag by using the
timestamp {ti} stored in the corresponding record of the PDA.
Step B. 2 The inpatient’s tag generates a random number r′W and computes
mT = PRNG(Inpatienti⊕ r′W ⊕PRNG(ti)⊕PRNG(KInpatienti)).
The tag sends {r′W ,mT } to the reader.
Step B. 3 The reader stores r′W and submits mT to the unit-dose tag.
Step B. 4 The unit-dose tag generates a random number r′M and computes
mUD = PRNG(UDi ⊕ r′M ⊕ PRNG(mT ) ⊕KUDi). The tag sends
{r′M ,mUD} to the reader.
Step B. 5 The reader stores r′M and submits mUD to the inpatient tag.
Step B. 6 The inpatient tag computes mTUD = PRNG(Inpatienti ⊕ mT ⊕
PRNG(mUD)⊕KInpatienti) and sends the result to the reader.
Step B. 7 The reader generates the evidence, ei = {Inpatienti, UDi, ti, r′W ,
r′M ,mTUD}.
Step B. 8 The intervention of the nurse (e.g. password authentication) is re-
quired to generate a digital signature of the evidence (sign(ei)). Fi-
nally, the evidence and the signature {ei, sign(ei)} are stored in the
corresponding PDA record.
As a consequence, the following information is stored in the nurse’s PDA
after the completion of her round:
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Inpatient1 UD1 t1 {e1, sign(e1)} Additional Information1
. . .
Inpatienti UDi ti {ei, sign(ei)} Additional Informationi
. . .
InpatientN UDN tN {eN , sign(eN )} Additional InformationN
Monitoring Procedure: The nurse comes back to her station. She logs into
the system – using a PC station – and informs the HIS about the unit-dose
administration process. Specifically, she transfers the records stored in the
PDA ({Inpatienti, UDi, ti, {ei, sign(ei)}, Additional Informationi}i=Ni=1 })
to the HIS database. The HIS checks the validity of the received evidence
and also examines that they were generated within the specified time
window. If an error is detected, an alarm is generated and an error drug
administration procedure is triggered. Furthermore, if an inpatient later
suffers a complication, the HIS is able to analyze the evidence. It is
also important to note that the proposed system renders the auditing
procedure easy.
4 Security, performance and cost analysis
RFID is a relatively heterogeneous technology with a significant number of con-
nected standards. Within these standards, one of the most relevant is the EPC
Gen-2 specification [10]. This standard can be considered as a “universal” spec-
ification for low-cost RFID tags. In this paper, we pursue to design an RFID
solution compatible with Gen-2 specification. The use of low-cost tags and
standardized solutions results in a moderate-cost investment. We assert that
the numerous benefits of RFID technology compensate for the slightly higher
price of individual tags as compared to printed barcodes.
It is well-known that the Gen-2 standard offers low-level security [20]. Par-
ticularly, privacy protection is not a main concern of this specification and tags
indiscriminately transmit their static identifier over the insecure radio channel.
To the best of our knowledge, this undesirable property is inherited by every
RFID grouping-proof protocol conforming to the standard [7, 12]. In the ap-
plication scenario of inpatient medication, confidential information such as the
patient treatment may be compromised by simple eavesdropping on the radio
channel. Our proposal is designed in such a way to take into consideration the
main security concerns (i.e. privacy, authentication, integrity) for the intended
medical application and requires only very slight modification of the EPC Gen-
2 specification. In fact, it is possible to reach a trade-off between designing a
reasonably secure system and being compatible with Gen-2 standard. IS-RFID
tags use a PRNG function and perform bitwise XOR operations as dictated
by the specification. The probability of having a successful brute-force attack
in the real-time check process (phase A) and the evidence generation process
(phase B) is bounded by 1/216. That is because the PRNG function supported
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by the employed tags has a length of 16 bits. Thus, the probability of having
a successful brute-force attack in the whole protocol is bounded by 1/232 since
each process (phases A and B) is independent from the other. The use of strong
cryptographic primitives instead of a simple 16-bit PRNG function would in-
crease the security level but also lead to stronger hardware requirements (i.e.
circuit area, memory and power consumption), and thus to more expensive tags.
In our design, the verification check (phase A) and the evidence genera-
tion (phase B) are completely independent. An improvement of the proposed
scheme is to link the two processes (i.e. the output of phase A, {vT , vUD} =
{PRNG(Inpatienti, rP , rW ), PRNG(UDi, rP , rM )}, could be used as input, in
phase B). This way, we would guarantee causality: phase A must be completed
before the execution of phase B. A straightforward solution could be the re-
placement of phase’s B input (i.e. the timestamp {ti}) – sent at the start of the
evidence generation – by the value {PRNG(ti ⊕ vT ⊕ vUD)}.
An important aspect of our proposal is its efficiency. Solutions based on
the use of pseudonyms – anonymized versions of the static identifiers – present
the drawback of needing an exhaustive search in the back-end database [5].
However, our approach does not suffer from this disadvantage, since we have
the advantage of knowing in advance which specific tags (i.e. the inpatients
and their corresponding medications) are involved in the identification process.
Due to this fact, the search is limited to a reduced number of tags and so the
efficiency of our system is increased.
As previously shown, the system can be considered secure and efficient be-
cause of the security mechanisms used. Next, we propose a procedure to test
the effectiveness of IS-RFID system in real environments. Let us consider a
hospital where floor A uses IS-RFID system and floor B continues using the
old system. The new system should be tested during a certain period of time
(e.g. 6 months). During this period, the following activities should be done: 1)
Check correspondence in HIS (logs) between what is expected to happen and
what really happened (i.e. errors in a) patient identification; b) administration
of drugs; c) dose, etc.); 2) Report nurses comments regarding usability and per-
formance; 3) Report inpatient comments about safety. After the completion
of the trial period, compare the results in floor A with results in floor B: 1)
Compare the number of errors (inpatient safety); 2) Compare times of nursing
rounds (efficiency and usability).
The necessary investment is affordable due to IS-RFID system fits into the
existing HIS and takes into account the most modern process in the management
of drugs (i.e. AMD). More precisely, the cost of deploying the system can be
computed adding up the price of the low-cost tags multiplied by the number
of inpatients and unit-doses. Let us consider a floor with 5,000 inpatients/year
and 3 unit-dose/day and a cost of $0.5/tag –including the plastic package of
each unit-dose. This means $20.55/day or $7,500/year. Every nurse should be
also equipped with a PDA in which a software of inpatient medication safety
is installed (∼$300). In the aforementioned example, we can assume that each
floor is attended by 3 nurses (4.5 inpatient/nurse). Finally, an average hospital
with 8 floors would have to cover a total investment of around $70,000/year.
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Note that the cost of HIS and AMD are excluded of this count since these
systems are already included in the overall costs of the hospital.
Finally, we assume that our system is not perfect and it may possess certain
weak points. In fact, the weaknesses of IS-RFID are those related to deploy a
new technology. A learning process by healthcare personnel is needed and new
procedures have to be applied. Although there is a cost for deploying the new
technology, the system offers a definite ROI in the inpatient medication safety.
The most serious risk is that nurses might rely on this new technology in such
a way that they relax and do not check possible human errors manually. For
instance, there can be an error when introducing the prescription in the HIS
database. In a such a case, the Automatic Medication Dispenser (AMD) would
prepare an erroneous unit-dose for the inpatient. Furthermore, errors can occur
if technology is not used appropriately by personnel. For example, a nurse who
has not administered a unit-dose to an inpatient could create an evidence of
having done it. The positive point here is that every event is logged into the
system and audit processes could detect these bad practices. We emphasize
that future improvements in healthcare will come both from better medicine
and from improved systems engineering. In Table 1, we summarize the positive
and negative points of IS-RFID.
5 Conclusion
The safe medication care is based on the “five-right” principles [3], namely:
treating the right inpatient, with the right drug, in the right dose, in the right
way and at the right time. IS-RFID has been designed to fulfill all of them.
Our proposed system covers the procedures in which medication errors occur
predominantly, that is medication orders and administering treatment. Thus,
handwritten prescriptions are substituted with electronic orders that are stored
in the HIS and sent to the pharmacy. Human slips such as taking an incorrect
pill with a similar name are drastically reduced, automating the identification
process of drugs and unit-doses (collection of drugs linked to inpatient treat-
ment). Lapses are also reduced, since nurses perform two checks: a human and
an electronic one. Thanks to IS-RFID, if the drugs administered to an inpa-
tient do not match her prescription, the administration process is stopped. Fur-
thermore, even if an error happens post-medication procedures can be quickly
implemented when the HIS checks the evidences that proves the simultaneous
presence of the unit-doses and the inpatients within a specified time window.
Not only the inpatient safety is enhanced but audit procedures become more
accurate and easier to perform. In this context, liability is cryptographically sup-
ported because the evidences are digitally signed providing the non-repudiation
property. Therefore, the investigation of errors can be done quickly and the
mechanisms to avoid their repetition can be developed rapidly.
IS-RFID also increases the efficiency of the healthcare personnel. Automa-
tion facilitates the work of nurses, physicians and pharmacists. Nurses do not
need to spend time decoding handwritten prescriptions or preparing unit-doses
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any longer. The matching between the unit-dose and the inpatient is done elec-
tronically so nurses can focus on the inpatient care. Furthermore, the evidence
of proper administration that the system generates allows the nurses to defend
their good professional practices.
It is important to note that our proposal is cost-effective and takes into
account the general hospital infrastructure: HIS, AMD and nurse stations. The
only additional demand is to equip nurses with a PDA that incorporates an
RFID reader. Other approaches [22] require portable PCs to visit the inpatients
or a wireless infrastructure. IS-RFID system only needs an online connection
to the HIS database at the nurses’ stations. In addition, the RFID tags are
not attached to single items (pills) but to unit-doses. The security properties
that RFID tags support in comparison to barcodes as well as the more general
benefits of RFID identification justify the investment.
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Table 1: Advantages and weaknesses of IS-RFID system.
Advantages Weaknesses√
Effectiveness on “five-right” method × Initial investment on new technology√
ROI in inpatient medication safety × Learning process√
Integration with HIS and AMD × Excessive confidence on technology√
Automatic verification√
Generation of evidences√
Audit and alarm process√
Increased efficiency
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P,EPCpallet cpallet = PRNG(PINpallet)
PINn = cn
P = CRC(TS||EPCpallet||mn||cpallet)








































MAC1 = PRNG(EPC1 ⊕ PRNG(PIN1)⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(N1))
MAC2 = PRNG(EPC2 ⊕ PRNG(PIN2)⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(N2))
MAC3 = PRNG(EPC3 ⊕ PRNG(PIN3)⊕ PRNG(NR)⊕ PRNG(N3))
EPCPallet, NPallet,
MACpallet
MACPallet = PRNG(EPCPallet ⊕ PRNG(PINPallet)
Figure 5: Chien et al. (2010) Online Fully Interactive Protocol to Enhance Inpatient
Medication Safety
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m2 = PRNG(EPC2 ⊕ PRNG(m1)⊕ PRNG(PIN2))
Tag n










m1 = PRNG(EPC1 ⊕ PRNG(t)⊕ PRNG(PIN1))
t = EKV (timestamp)
Figure 6: Chien et al. (2010) Offline Protocol to Enhance Inpatient Medication Safety
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4 .  Monitoring Procedure
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1 . Drug Package Procedure
3 .  Safe Drug Administration Procedure
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             3.1. Real-time Verification 
             3.2. Evidence Generation
Unit-dose 
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Figure 4: Phases of IS-RFID system
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Figure 5: IS-RFID protocol
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